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Flexible behavior and decision making require an executive 
control system, which oversees subordinate processes and 
intervenes when outcomes become suboptimal (Monsell & 
Driver, 2000). Impairments in executive control lead to mal-
adaptive behavior because irrelevant motor actions are not 
inhibited. Similarly, less supervision by the executive system 
leads to impaired decision making because distracting infor-
mation and suboptimal choices are not suppressed. Studies in 
the clinical and neuroscience domains suggest that executive 
control of the motor system may share mechanisms with high-
level decision making. For instance, the latency of stopping 
motor responses is prolonged in pathological gamblers (e.g., 
Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & Van Den Brink, 2006; but 
see Lipszyc & Schachar, 2010). Similar response-inhibition 
deficits have been observed in other impulse-control disor-
ders, such as ADHD (Chamberlain & Sahakian, 2007; Nigg, 
2001), or in individuals with substance dependence (Bechara, 
Noel, & Crone, 2006; de Wit, 2009).
Cognitive neuroscience studies suggest that brain areas 
associated with inhibiting motor output also regulate risk- 
taking behavior by suppressing superficially attractive but 
risky choices (Cohen & Lieberman, 2010; Knoch et al., 2006). 
For example, Knoch et al. (2006) used transcranial magnetic 
stimulation to show that temporarily disrupting the right dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)—which is important for 
executive control of motor actions (Bogacz, Wagenmakers, 
Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010; Garavan, Ross, & Stein, 
1999; Ivanoff, Branning, & Marois, 2008)—led to increased 
risk taking in gambling. On the basis of such findings, 
researchers have proposed that efficient control of impulses 
and urges in different domains relies on overlapping inhibitory 
mechanisms that allow people to suppress thoughts, actions, 
and decisions that are inappropriate, suboptimal, or potentially 
harmful (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Crews & 
Boettiger, 2009; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, & Van den 
Brink, 2004). However, direct support for such claims is scarce 
and mostly limited to correlational findings.
Therefore, we sought to uncover direct evidence that inhib-
itory motor control shares mechanisms with decision making 
when gambling by examining how these processes interact in 
multitask situations. Intuitively, people assume that the brain 
isolates decision making in different domains, with problems 
at higher cognitive levels (e.g., “should I take a day off or go 
to work?”) solved independently of problems at motor levels 
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Abstract
Less supervision by the executive system after disruption of the right prefrontal cortex leads to increased risk taking in 
gambling because superficially attractive—but risky—choices are not suppressed. Similarly, people might gamble more in 
multitask situations than in single-task situations because concurrent executive processes usually interfere with each other. 
In the study reported here, we used a novel monetary decision-making paradigm to investigate whether multitasking could 
reduce rather than increase risk taking in gambling. We found that performing a task that induced cautious motor responding 
reduced gambling in a multitask situation (Experiment 1). We then found that a short period of inhibitory training lessened 
risk taking in gambling at least 2 hr later (Experiments 2 and 3). Our findings indicate that proactive motor control strongly 
affects monetary risk taking in gambling. The link between control systems at different cognitive levels might be exploited to 
develop new methods for rehabilitation of addiction and impulse-control disorders.
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(e.g., “should I reach for that hot saucepan?”). However, 
behavioral scientists have shown that making multiple deci-
sions simultaneously typically leads to impoverished behavior 
(Marois & Ivanoff, 2005; Pashler & Johnston, 1998). For 
example, using a cell phone in the car hinders driving perfor-
mance (Strayer & Johnston, 2001). Similarly, monetary deci-
sion making might become less regulated in multitask 
situations because concurrent executive processes usually 
interfere with each other. Therefore, people might place riskier 
bets when gambling in multitask situations than in single-task 
situations because the executive system would be less able to 
suppress the tendency to pick higher and more appealing—yet 
also more risky—amounts.
But are the effects of multitasking on gambling and decision 
making necessarily detrimental? In the study reported here, we 
asked whether executive control in a concurrent task might 
actually reduce rather than increase risk taking in gambling. 
Specifically, we examined whether instructing participants to 
occasionally stop a motor response while they made monetary 
decisions encouraged them to place safer bets. Evidence of such 
a transfer of control between cognitive domains would have two 
important implications. First, it would provide direct support for 
the hypothesis that there is an overlap in executive mechanisms 
that regulate motor responses and decision making. Second, it 
could open new avenues for the treatment of psychiatric disor-
ders that are linked to impaired inhibitory control, such as 
ADHD, substance abuse, and pathological gambling.
We examined the interaction between motor control and 
gambling using a novel behavioral task (Fig. 1). Participants 
were asked to gamble on one of six monetary amounts; how-
ever, participants were informed that the higher the amount, 
the less probable a win. Thus, selecting higher amounts consti-
tuted a more risky bet, whereas selecting lower amounts con-
stituted a safer bet. Risk taking in our task consisted of 
preferring relatively higher amounts that carried a higher 
probability of losing (and in case of the most risky options, a 
negative expected value)1 over lower amounts that carried a 
lower probability of losing (Boyer, 2006); this is the same 
behavior that pathological gamblers engage in when, for 
example, wagering on horse races.
In Experiment 1, participants performed the gambling task 
throughout the session. In some blocks (dual-task blocks), 
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You win
112 points
Current balance
2512 points
1.333 or 1.667 s 2.5 s
1.333 or 1.667 s
Signal Trials
a
b
Correct stop; you win
10 points
Current balance
2510 points
Fig. 1. Example sequences for (a) no-signal trials and (b) signal trials in Experiment 1. In both types of trials, participants were presented 
with a display showing six numbers that indicated the number of points that could be won on that trial. These numbers were aligned 
above the letter keys to which they were assigned. The bars started rising after a 3.5-s delay and stopped at the top line after 1.333 s or 
1.667 s (arrows are for illustrative purposes only). On no-signal trials, participants had to choose a number before the end of the trial 
but not sooner than 0.25 s before the bars reached the top line. On signal trials, the top of the bars turned black before the top line was 
reached. On these trials, participants either had to refrain from responding (stop group) or make an extra response by pressing the space 
bar after choosing a number (double-response group). On no-signal trials, participants received the chosen number of points if they won, 
and they forfeited half the chosen number of points if they lost; on signal trials, subjects won or lost a fixed amount (see the Method 
section for details). At the end of each trial, participants were told how much they had won or lost and what their current balance was.
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they also undertook a secondary task. The nature of the sec-
ondary task depended on the condition participants were 
assigned to. In the double-response condition, the secondary 
task required participants to occasionally execute an additional 
response when an extra signal occurred. Research has shown 
that monitoring for occasional signals and preparing additional 
responses increase dual-task demands (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009c). If executive processes at different levels of control 
interfere with each other, then participants should place riskier 
bets in dual-task blocks than in single-task blocks (in which 
participants had to perform only the gambling task) because 
the executive system would be less able to suppress the ten-
dency to choose the riskier amounts (Cohen & Lieberman, 
2010; Knoch et al., 2006).
In the stop condition, participants tried to stop themselves 
from making a choice when a signal occurred. Three accounts 
offered opposing predictions regarding participants’ choice 
behavior in the stop condition. According to the interference 
account, cross-task interference in multitask situations should 
cause participants to place riskier bets in dual-task blocks than 
in single-task blocks. By contrast, the transfer account holds 
that occasionally stopping motor responses should induce a 
general state of cautiousness that may propagate across cogni-
tive domains. When preparing to stop, people make proactive 
adjustments and become more cautious in executing motor 
responses (Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). If there is 
an overlap between mechanisms that regulate motor cautious-
ness and mechanisms that control gambling behavior, then 
cautiousness may transfer between domains; consequently, 
preparation for stopping motor responses might encourage risk-
aversive behavior. Finally, according to the independence 
account, the cognitive processes involved in motor inhibition 
and gambling are mechanistically distinct; therefore, perform-
ing a double-response or stop task should not influence mone-
tary decision making.
In Experiment 1, we found support for the transfer account. 
We therefore conducted two additional experiments in which 
participants completed a stop task or a double-response task 
prior to the gambling task, to test whether motor inhibition 
training leads to more cautious gambling behavior later in 
time.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Forty-four adults participated for monetary 
compensation (£6 per hr, plus money won in the gambling 
task). Table 1 shows participant characteristics and amounts 
won. Participants were divided equally between the double-
response and stop groups. The groups were matched for gen-
der and age. There were no group differences in impulsivity 
(assessed using the 11th version of the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) or general risk- 
seeking behavior (assessed using the Stimulating-Instrumental 
Risk Inventory; Zaleskiewicz, 2001). All experiments were 
approved by the research ethics committee of the Cardiff Uni-
versity School of Psychology.
Procedure. Stimuli were presented on a 19-in. LCD monitor 
against a gray background. The task was run using the Psycho-
physics Toolbox (Version 3; Brainard, 1997). On each trial, six 
vertical bars of equal height were arrayed left to right above a 
horizontal line; there was a second horizontal line at the top of 
the screen (Fig. 1). Each bar was associated with a different 
monetary amount and a specific response key (the “d,” “f,” 
“g,” “h,” “j,” or “k” key of a keyboard). Subjects were 
instructed to select one of the amounts by pressing the corre-
sponding key, and they were informed that the probability of 
winning decreased as the amount increased. Rather than sim-
ply presenting the amounts from lowest to highest, we varied 
the order from trial to trial to prevent choice from being driven 
by spatial-attention or response-bias effects (which might 
occur, for example, if higher amounts were consistently pre-
sented on the right of the screen).
At the start of each trial in the single-task blocks (Fig. 1a), 
there was a 3.5-s delay, and then the bars started rising together. 
All bars reached the top line simultaneously after 1.33 s on 
low-bar trials (in which the distance between the bottom and 
top lines was approximately 7.5 cm) or after 1.67 s on high-bar 
trials (in which the distance between the bottom and top lines 
was approximately 9 cm). We manipulated bar height to test 
for effects of choice latency (see Supplementary Analyses 
Experiment 1 in the Supplemental Material available online). 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Experiments 1 Through 3
Variable        Experiment 1 (N = 44)       Experiment 2 (N = 81)        Experiment 3 (N = 54)
Gender 52% female, 48% male 63% female, 37% male 69% female, 31% male
Mean age 24.0 years (range = 18–40 years) 23.6 years (range = 18–41 years) 21.3 years (range = 18–33 years)
Mean winnings £0.5 (range = £0–1.9) £1.5 (range = £0–4.2) £1.5 (range = £0–4.2)
Mean BIS-11 score 62 (SD = 21) 65 (SD = 9.8) 65 (SD = 8.9)
Mean SIRI score 39 (SD = 6.3) 37 (SD = 6.6) 39 (SD = 7.3)
Note: The range of possible scores on the 11th version of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) is 30 to 125; 
higher scores indicate more impulsive behavior. On the Stimulating-Instrumental Risk Inventory (SIRI; Zaleskiewicz, 2001), scores of 45 and below 
indicate a tendency toward avoiding taking risks.
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Trials ended 0.25 s after the bars reached the top line. The long 
time intervals (average = 5 s) and the initial phase in which the 
bars did not rise ensured that there was minimal time pressure 
to make a decision. Participants had to make a response before 
the end of the trial but not sooner than 0.25 s before the bars 
reached the top line. We used the moving bars and the response-
window restrictions to ensure that stop signals could be pre-
sented at an optimal moment (see also Coxon, Stinear, & 
Byblow, 2007). Feedback was presented at the end of each 
trial to indicate how much participants had won or lost and 
what their current balance was. The feedback screen was 
replaced by a blank screen after 2.5 s, and the following trial 
started after a further 0.5 s.
In dual-task blocks, the procedure was the same as in 
single-task blocks on two of every three trials; however, on 
one of every three trials (signal trials), the top of the rising bars 
turned black just before reaching the top line (see Fig. 1b). On 
signal trials in the double-response group, participants had to 
press the space bar of the keyboard with either thumb after 
they had indicated their monetary choice. They had to press 
the space bar within 0.25 s after the bars reached the top line. 
On signal trials in the stop group, participants tried to refrain 
from making any response on the keyboard. In both groups, 
the moment of signal presentation was dynamically adjusted 
using a tracking procedure, which ensured that each individual 
would succeed in making the double response (double-
response group) or withhold the response (stop group) on 
approximately 50% of the signal trials. Initially, the bars 
turned black 0.266 s before the top line was reached. When 
participants successfully stopped their response or pressed the 
space bar in time, this delay was decreased by 0.033 s on the 
following trial, which made it harder to successfully stop or 
execute the double response. When participants failed to stop 
or execute the double-response in time, the delay was increased 
by 0.033 s. At the beginning of each block, a cue (“NO- 
SIGNAL BLOCK” or “SIGNAL BLOCK”) was presented in 
the center of the screen.
On each trial in both single- and dual-task blocks, partici-
pants could win or lose points. The exact amount depended on 
the stakes (low, medium, or high). The numbers of points par-
ticipants could win in the low-stakes condition were 112 (pwin = 
.15), 64 (pwin = .27), 32 (pwin = .39), 16 (pwin = .51), 6 (pwin = .63), 
or 2 (pwin = .75). When participants lost, they lost half of the 
amount they gambled. A random number generator determined 
whether a participant won or lost. On each trial, a number 
between 0 and 1 was selected; when the generated number was 
smaller than the probability of winning the chosen amount, par-
ticipants won; otherwise, they lost. Amounts decreased expo-
nentially to make the higher amounts more attractive. Without 
revealing the exact probabilities, we informed participants at the 
beginning of the experiment that the probability of winning was 
lower for higher amounts. Because we could not infer which 
response participants were planning to execute on successful 
stop-signal trials, the number of points won or lost on all signal 
trials was fixed. Participants won 10 points on successful signal 
trials and lost 10 points on unsuccessful signal trials in both the 
stop and double-response groups. Thus, on double-response tri-
als, participants always won or lost 10 points, regardless of their 
choice. Similarly, on unsuccessful stop trials, participants 
always lost 10 points, regardless of the amount they indicated 
with their incorrectly executed choice response.
In the medium-stakes condition, all amounts were two 
times greater than in the low-stakes condition; in the high-
stakes condition, amounts were four times greater than in the 
low-stakes condition. We manipulated the stakes for several 
reasons: to increase selection demands, to encourage process-
ing of the different amounts on each trial, and to encourage 
participants to consider the relative risk or benefit of each 
amount. The three stakes occurred in random order with equal 
probability, and participants were not explicitly informed 
whether the trial featured low, medium, or high stakes. Each 
participant’s starting balance was 2,500 points. At the end of 
the experiment, the total amount won was converted to money 
(1,000 points = £1).
The experiment started with a short practice phase that con-
sisted of a single-task block and a dual-task block. Practice 
trials were conducted following the same procedure used for 
test trials. The balance of points won or lost was reset after 
this practice phase. The experimental phase consisted of four 
single-task blocks and four dual-task blocks of 36 trials each. 
There was a short break between each block, and single- and 
dual-task blocks alternated.
Betting scores. For each participant, we calculated a betting 
score by taking the average of all his or her choices (range = 
1–6). Choice 1 corresponded to the smallest amount, which 
had the highest probability of winning (hence was the safest 
bet). Choice 6 was the highest amount, which had the lowest 
probability of winning (hence was the most risky bet). Conse-
quently, a higher average betting score indicated that partici-
pants preferred riskier bets with a lower probability of 
winning.
Results and discussion
Approximately 50% of responses on signal trials were correct, 
which confirmed the effectiveness of the tracking procedures 
(failed double responses = 46%, failed stops = 47%). Thus, 
there was no consistent difference in success rates on signal 
trials between the groups (F < 1). Even though we did not use 
separate tracking procedures for each stake, additional analy-
ses showed that the percentage of failed signal trials was simi-
lar for each stake (low stakes = 47%, medium stakes = 46%, 
high stakes = 49%; p > .39). This was true for both groups (i.e., 
the interaction between stake and group was not significant, 
p > .18).
To test the effect of multitasking on gambling, we com-
pared betting scores between dual-task and single-task blocks. 
We concentrated specifically on no-signal trials. This allowed 
us to isolate the behavioral effects of monitoring for extra 
 by guest on July 16, 2013pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Executive Control of Gambling 809
signals and preparing to either make a double response or to 
stop the first response (in dual-task blocks), compared with 
conditions without such demands (single-task blocks).
We analyzed betting scores using a mixed analysis of vari-
ance with block type (single task vs. dual task) and stake (low, 
medium, high) as within-subjects factors and group (double 
response vs. stop) as a between-subjects factor (see Table 2). 
Results showed that participants in the double-response group 
tended to place more risky bets in dual-task blocks (mean bet-
ting score = 2.77) than in single-task blocks (mean betting 
score = 2.72; Fig. 2a), but this effect failed to reach signifi-
cance. More important, however, participants in the stop group 
showed the opposite result: They not only became more cau-
tious when making their choices (as indexed by longer choice 
latencies; see Supplementary Analyses Experiment 1 in the 
Supplemental Material), but also placed overall safer bets in 
dual-task blocks (mean betting score = 2.62) than in single-
task blocks (mean betting score = 2.77), F(1, 23) = 4.7, p = 
.04, ηp
2 = .19.
The effect of block type in the stop group shows that prepar-
ing to stop motor responses encourages cautious monetary deci-
sions and that this cautiousness counteracts and reverses the 
detrimental effects usually associated with multitasking. Thus, 
multitasking does not necessarily lead to increased risk taking in 
gambling; concurrent executive processes can make people 
generally risk aversive when these processes regulate cautious-
ness at a motor level.2 This conclusion was supported by a sig-
nificant two-way Block Type × Group interaction (p < .05). 
There was also a main effect of stake, which indicated that bet-
ting scores were lower when stakes were high (p < .001; mean 
betting scores: high stakes = 2.29, medium stakes = 2.68, low 
stakes = 3.18). No other effects reached significance (Table 2).
Additional analyses of specific choices showed that partici-
pants in the stop group tended to select the most risky bets 
(Choice 6) less often in dual-task blocks than in single-task 
blocks (Fig. 2b).3 Furthermore, for the dual-task blocks in the 
stop group, there was a preference for Choice 1 (the safest 
option), which had a lower expected value than did Choices 3 
through 5.4 Thus, it appears that participants in the stop group 
became overly cautious in dual-task blocks, as taking a certain 
amount of risk was rewarded in our gambling task. Further 
analyses also showed that the difference in betting scores 
between block types in the stop condition was not caused by 
Table 2. Results of the Analysis of Variance for Experiment 1
Factor df F      p
Group 1, 46 0.05 .83
Block type 1, 46 1.15 .29
Stake 2, 92 135.3 .001
Group × Block Type 1, 46 4.29 .04
Group × Stake 2, 92 1.14 .33
Block Type × Stake 2, 92 0.94 .40
Group × Block Type × Stake 2, 92 0.38 .69
Note: Significant results are presented in boldface (p < .05).
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block types is shown in (b). Choice 1 was the safest bet; Choice 6 was the riskiest bet.
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differences in choice latencies, effects of probability learning, 
estimation of the expected value of the choice options, block 
order, increased variability, or priming of participants to focus 
more on either wins or losses (see Analyses of Average Stan-
dard Deviation and Supplementary Analyses Experiment 1 in 
the Supplemental Material). Finally, a closer inspection of the 
distribution of keys selected by participants demonstrated that 
in all conditions, participants took amounts into account when 
they made their choice (see Table E4 in the Supplemental 
Material).
Experiments 2 and 3
Experiment 1 demonstrated that simultaneously regulating 
motor performance and making monetary decisions does not 
necessarily lead to increased risk taking in gambling. On the 
contrary, preparing to withhold a motor response encourages a 
cautious executive control state that generalizes to seemingly 
unrelated monetary decisions. Next, we asked whether motor 
cautiousness would also influence monetary gambling when 
these processes were separated in time. A recent study showed 
that performing an inhibition task in which participants had to 
ignore words led to depletion of executive control resources; 
this caused more risk-taking behavior in a subsequent gam-
bling task (Freeman & Muraven, 2010). This finding seems at 
odds with the results of Experiment 1. However, we propose 
that in our gambling task, proactive motor slowing—which is 
prominent in the stop task but not necessarily in other inhibi-
tion tasks—counteracted any depletion effects and encouraged 
risk-aversive monetary decision making.
In Experiments 2 and 3, we tested whether this transfer of 
cautiousness would still be present when the gambling task 
followed the stop task. Both experiments consisted of two 
phases: a training phase, which did not involve gambling, and 
a test phase, in which participants chose among different 
amounts they could win. The test phase did not involve an 
additional task; therefore, all test blocks were identical to the 
single-task blocks from Experiment 1. The only differences 
between Experiments 2 and 3 were that Experiment 2 included 
a control group that immediately started with the gambling 
task, and the test phase in Experiment 3 was conducted 2 hr 
after the training phase was completed.
Method
Participants. One hundred thirty-five adults participated for 
monetary compensation (£6 per hr, plus money won in the 
gambling task). Table 1 shows participant characteristics and 
amounts won. In each experiment, participants were divided 
equally into groups matched for gender and age. Participants 
were assessed for impulsivity and general risk-taking behavior 
as in Experiment 1, and there were no group differences in 
either of these factors.
Procedure. In addition to the double-response and stop 
groups, Experiment 2 included a control group, which started 
immediately with the gambling task. The double-response and 
stop groups started with a training phase in which the primary 
task was to identify a go stimulus (square vs. diamond) as rap-
idly and accurately as possible (Fig. 3). On no-signal trials, 
participants saw a central fixation point for 0.75 s, after which 
either an open square or an open diamond surrounded the fixa-
tion point for 1.5 s. Participants responded with their left or 
right hands, respectively (“c” or “m” on a keyboard) to iden-
tify the stimulus as either a square or a diamond.
Signal trials (25% of all training trials) began in the same 
way as no-signal trials, but the outline of the diamond or 
square shape turned bold after a variable stimulus onset asyn-
chrony (SOA). On these trials, participants in the double-
response group had to press the space bar as quickly as possible 
with either thumb after they pressed “c” or “m”; participants in 
the stop group were instructed to refrain from responding. The 
SOA between the go stimulus (the shape) and the signal was 
initially set at 0.25 s. In the stop group, the SOA was continu-
ously adjusted according to a tracking procedure so that par-
ticipants would be able to stop on approximately 50% of trials 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). When participants made a 
response, the SOA decreased by 0.05 s on the following trial 
(signal-respond trial); when participants successfully stopped, 
the SOA increased by 0.05 s on the following trial (signal-
inhibit trial).
...
No-Signal Trial
Signal Trial
0.75 s
0.25 s0.75 s
1.5 s
1.5 s – (SOA +
0.25 s)
SOA
Fig. 3. Example trial sequence from the training phase of Experiments 
2 and 3. On no-signal trials, participants saw a central fixation point, 
after which either an open square or an open diamond surrounded the 
fixation point. Participants had to hit either “c” or “m” on the keyboard 
to indicate “square” or “diamond.” Signal trials began in the same way, but 
the shape around the fixation point turned bold after a variable stimulus 
onset asynchrony (SOA), which was initially set at 0.25 s and subsequently 
adjusted using a tracking procedure (see the Method section for details). 
The boldface was removed from the shape after 0.25 s, and the nonboldface 
shape remained on-screen for the remainder of the trial. Participants tried 
to either withhold a response (stop group) or generate an extra response 
by pressing an alternate key (double-response group).
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In the double-response group, we simulated a tracking pro-
cedure to produce a similar range of SOAs as in the stop group 
(see Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c, for a similar procedure). In 
the simulation, we used an estimate of the reaction time to the 
stop signal (0.225 s). This value was based on findings of our 
previous studies (e.g., Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). When the 
latency of the first response on a double-response trial was 
shorter than the SOA plus 0.225 s, the SOA decreased by 0.05 
s on the following trial (viz., signal-respond trial); when the 
latency of the first response on a double-response trial was 
longer than the SOA plus 0.225 s, the SOA increased by 0.05 
s on the following trial (viz., signal-inhibit trial).
The training phase of Experiment 2 consisted of 10 blocks 
of 72 trials each (~30 min in total), with a short break between 
each block. No points were awarded in the training phase. Par-
ticipants took a 2-min break after the training phase, then 
began the test phase, which consisted of 7 blocks of 12 trials 
each. The control group started immediately with the test 
phase. During the test phase, participants completed the same 
gambling task as in the single-task blocks of Experiment 1 
(thus, all trials were no-signal trials in the test phase). The 
training phase of Experiment 3 consisted of 15 blocks of 56 
trials each (~35 min in total). The test phase followed the 
training phase after 2 hr. During this 2-hr delay, participants 
were free to leave the lab but were asked to report what they 
had done after they returned for the test phase. There were 14 
blocks in the test phase of Experiment 3.
Results and discussion
For each experiment, we analyzed betting scores using a 
mixed analysis of variance with block (Experiment 2: Test 
Block 1–7; Experiment 3: Test Block 1–14) and stake (low, 
medium, high) as within-subjects factors and group (double-
response, stop, or control) as the between-subjects factor 
(Table 3). Because there were not enough observations for a 
full factorial analysis, we performed separate tests for block 
and stake.
Results of Experiment 2 revealed a reliable aftereffect of 
executive control training on gambling behavior (Fig. 4). 
Participants in the stop group took 10% to 15% less mone-
tary risk than did participants in the double-response group, 
F(1, 52) = 6.1, p = .02, ηp
2 = .11, and the control group, 
which did not receive any training, F(1, 52) = 10.8, p = .002, 
ηp
2 = .17. This finding demonstrates that motor cautiousness 
in the stop task transferred to monetary decision making, 
even when the stop and gambling tasks did not overlap in 
time. There was a numerical trend for higher betting scores 
in the double-response group than in the control group, which 
would be consistent with a depletion account; however, the 
difference was not significant (p = .29).
Thus, the cognitive characteristics of the training phase were 
crucial: Cautiousness transferred from the training phase to the 
test phase only when the training phase involved stopping and 
not when it involved executing a second response. This conclu-
sion was supported by a significant main effect of group (p = 
.003; Table 3). A closer inspection of choice proportions (Fig. 5) 
showed that there were significant differences between the con-
trol group and the stop group for Choice 5, p < .001, and Choice 
4, p < .029. When we collapsed across Choices 1 through 3, the 
difference between the control and stop groups was marginally 
significant (p = .05). There were differences between the 
double-response group and the stop group for Choice 6, p < 
.027, and Choice 5, p < .016. When we collapsed across Choices 
1 through 3, the difference between double-response and stop 
group was also significant (p < .022).
In Experiment 3, we tested whether the transfer of cautious-
ness was still present when the delay between the training phase 
and the test phase was increased. Participants again performed 
either the double-response task or the stop task in the training 
phase, but the test phase was now undertaken 2 hr later. Consis-
tent with Experiment 2, results of Experiment 3 showed that 
participants in the stop group took 10% to 15% less risk than 
did participants in the double-response group (Fig. 4). The 
main effect of group was again significant (p = .03; Table 3). As 
Figure 5 shows, participants in the stop group selected Choice 1 
more often than participants in the double-response group did, 
p < .011. When we collapsed across Choices 5 and 6, the fre-
quency of making this choice differed significantly between the 
stop and double-response groups, p < .05.
Taken together, the results of Experiments 2 and 3 show that 
cautiousness at a motor level influences gambling behavior, 
even when motor training and monetary decision making occur 
at least 2 hr apart. The effects in the test blocks did not correlate 
with the outcome of the stop process in the training phase and 
were not caused by differences in choice latencies (see 
Table 3. Results of the Analyses of Variance for the Test Phases of 
Experiments 2 and 3
Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Factor  df F p  df F p
Group 2, 78 6.44 .003 1, 52 4.89 .03
Block 6, 468 8.17 .001 13, 676 6.42 .001
Stake 2, 156 41.26 .001 2, 104 13.97 .001
Group × Block 12, 468 0.66 .79 13, 676 0.51 .92
Group × Stake 4, 156 0.63 .64 2, 104 0.69 .51
Note: Significant results are presented in boldface (p < .05).
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Supplementary Analyses Experiments 2–3 in the Supplemental 
Material). Furthermore, analyses of choice proportions showed 
that after stop training, participants specifically avoided the two 
most risky bets (Fig. 5). On the basis of these findings, we pro-
pose that the requirement to occasionally stop a motor response 
can train people to become cautious and less impulsive when 
they make monetary decisions. This increased cautiousness 
might overcome the previously observed effect of depleting the 
executive control system (Freeman & Muraven, 2010).
A recent study showed that participants who were instructed 
to be cautious in a stop-signal task (similar to the one used 
here in Experiments 2 and 3) consumed less food in a subse-
quent test phase than participants who were instructed to 
respond as quickly and impulsively as possible (Guerrieri, 
Nederkoorn, Schrooten, Martijn, & Jansen, 2009). Unfortu-
nately, the lack of an appropriate control condition in this pre-
vious study obscures the underlying basis of this effect, which 
could have arisen due to increased cautiousness, increased 
impulsivity, or a combination of both (Guerrieri et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, these findings are consistent with our observa-
tion that engaging in an inhibitory motor task can boost behav-
ioral caution and reduce impulsivity.
Future work should further explore how stopping-induced 
cautiousness and reduced motor impulsivity can transfer to 
various clinically relevant behaviors, including cigarette smok-
ing and consumption of food and alcohol (see also Friese, 
Hofmann, & Wiers, 2011). Mechanisms that regulate stopping 
and motor cautiousness might also overlap with mechanisms 
that govern the choice between a small, immediate reward 
compared with a larger but delayed reward (Kim & Lee, 2011; 
but see also Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011). If there is indeed 
such an overlap, we would predict that stop training should bias 
intertemporal choice toward larger delayed rewards.
General Discussion
A convergence of evidence shows that decision making 
depends on two information streams: automatic processes 
that are associative and often emotionally driven, and reason-
ing processes that are rule governed and rational (for a review, 
see Evans, 2008). Suppression of the former in favor of the 
latter requires executive control processes. In the study 
reported here, we focused on how executive processes regu-
late decision making when people gamble. When gambling, 
most people realize that the odds are against them; in eco-
nomic terms, they often know that the expected value of high-
risk gambles is negative. As such, research on gambling can 
reveal important information about how people regulate 
choice when they are presented with superficially attractive 
but risky options.
We found that situational factors have a substantial impact 
on the executive control of decision making in a gambling task. 
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Fig. 4. Mean betting score as a function of group and block in (a) Experiment 2 and (b) Experiment 3.
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In Experiment 1, motor cautiousness reduced risky betting in a 
novel gambling task, thus showing that concurrent executive 
processes need not interfere detrimentally. Instead, control in 
the motor domain can transfer to other decision-making 
domains, in this case monetary gambling. Furthermore, we 
found that training people, even briefly, in controlling their own 
motor actions can induce cautious and risk-aversive decision 
making for at least 2 hr afterward (Experiments 2 and 3). In 
these experiments, occasional motor inhibition reduced mone-
tary risk taking by approximately 10% to 15%. This effect size 
is comparable to those found in previous studies that have 
manipulated risk taking using brain-stimulation methods. For 
instance, Knoch et al. (2006) found a 15% increase in risk tak-
ing in the Cambridge Gambling Task after transcranial mag-
netic stimulation of the right DLPFC; in contrast, Fecteau et al. 
(2007) found a 10% decrease in risk taking using the Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task following prefrontal transcranial direct 
current stimulation. Combined with evidence that transcranial 
direct current stimulation can potentiate learning (Nitsche et al., 
2008), these findings suggest that brain stimulation could aug-
ment the training effects we have found.
We propose that increased motor cautiousness, which is a 
prominent feature of the stop task, reduced risk-taking behavior 
when making monetary decisions. Future studies should exam-
ine whether similar effects can be obtained through alternative 
methods of inducing motor caution, for example, by instructing 
people to favor accuracy over speed in a standard choice task. 
Many studies have shown that participants are more cautious 
when they are instructed to respond as accurately as possible, 
and we have proposed previously that strategy adjustments in 
the speed-accuracy paradigm resemble those in the stop-signal 
paradigm (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c).
From a theoretical perspective, our results suggest that 
executive processes at motor domains share mechanisms with 
monetary decision making and gambling. Recent cognitive 
neuroscience studies have shown that frontal brain areas 
involved in action monitoring and response inhibition might 
also be involved in monetary decision making in gambling 
tasks (Clark, 2010; Knoch et al., 2006). Similarly, studies have 
shown that the latency of stopping a motor response is pro-
longed in pathological gamblers (e.g., Goudriaan et al., 2006). 
However, such correlational findings are difficult to interpret 
definitively. Instead, our results show that motor control can 
causally modulate risk taking in monetary gambling. This 
functional overlap suggests that inhibitory motor control and 
gambling share executive resources, which opens new ave-
nues for the investigation of cognitive and neural mechanisms 
of executive control at different processing levels.
More generally, our results show that exerting executive 
control over actions and decisions can be practiced (see also 
Friese et al., 2011; Muraven, 2010). These findings have 
potential clinical relevance because impairments in executive 
control, and particularly stopping, have been linked to 
the development of several impulse-control disorders, includ-
ing ADHD, substance abuse, and pathological gambling 
(Chambers et al., 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Further-
more, recovery from addiction requires inhibition of repetitive 
addictive behavior (Crews & Boettiger, 2009). Consistent with 
the idea that response inhibition is critical for recovery, the 
findings of Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, De Beurs, and Van Den 
Brink (2008) showed that motor disinhibition was a strong 
predictor of relapse in gamblers. Similarly, motor-inhibition 
efficiency predicted the treatment outcome in people with eat-
ing disorders (Nederkoorn, Jansen, Mulkens, & Jansen, 2007). 
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
C
ho
ic
e 
Pr
op
or
tio
n
Choice
Stop Group
Double-Response Group
Control Group
Choice
Stop Group
Double-Response Group
a b
.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
6321 546321 54
Fig. 5. Results of (a) Experiment 2 and (b) Experiment 3: distribution of choices in each of the 
groups. Choice 1 was the safest bet; Choice 6 was the riskiest bet.
 by guest on July 16, 2013pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
814  Verbruggen et al. 
Therefore, the link we found in the present study between pro-
active motor control and monetary risk taking in gambling 
suggests promising new avenues for clinical therapy that tar-
get motor inhibition.
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Notes
1. See Amounts, Probabilities of Winning, and Expected Values in 
the Supplemental Material available online for more information 
about expected values.
2. We replicated this finding in a pilot experiment (N = 40), in which 
the procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except that we used 
fixed signal delays. In this experiment, there was a significant Group × 
Block Type × Stake interaction (p = .008). Separate comparisons 
showed that in the stop group, the dual-task effect corresponded to a 
reliable decrease in betting scores for low stakes, F(1, 19) = 8.0, p = .01, 
and medium stakes, F(1, 19) = 6.0, p = .02; there was also a strong trend 
for high stakes, F(1, 19) = 3.9, p = .06. In the double-response group, 
the dual-task effect instead led to increased betting when stakes were 
low, F(1, 19) = 5.2, p = .03; there was no reliable dual-task effect for 
medium and high stakes (both ps > .12). Thus, multitasking tended 
to increase betting in the double-response group but decrease betting 
in the stop group. However, because the probability of stopping was 
lower than the probability of responding in time on a double-response 
signal trial, we sought to replicate this finding in Experiment 1, in 
which the moment of signal presentation was dynamically adjusted in 
both groups.
3. In the stop group of the pilot experiment, we found that the prob-
ability of making Choice 1 was higher (p < .029) and the probability 
of making Choice 5 was lower (p < .0027) in the dual-task blocks 
than in the single-task blocks. In addition, the probability of making 
Choice 6 tended to differ between block types, p < .056. When we 
combined the data of Experiment 1 and the pilot experiment to 
increase power (N = 44), we found that the probability of making 
Choice 1 in dual-task blocks (.270) was significantly higher than the 
probability of making Choice 1 in single-task blocks (.215), p = .003. 
By contrast, the probability of making Choice 6 was reliably lower 
in dual-task blocks (.048) than in single-task blocks (.062); p = 
.0097; a similar difference was observed for the probability of mak-
ing Choice 5 in dual-task blocks (.081) and in single-task blocks 
(.097; p = .028). None of the other differences reached significance 
(all ps > .11)
4. We manipulated expected values to ensure that there were two 
choices with a negative expected value, three options with positive 
expected values but different probabilities of winning, and one 
option with a high probability of winning but a positive expected 
value closer to zero (see Amounts, Probabilities of Winning, and 
Expected Values in the Supplemental Material).
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Supplementary Information 
Amounts, probabilities of winning, and expected values of the free-choice options 
Table E1 shows for each free-choice option the associated amounts for the three stakes (high, 
medium, low), probability of winning [p(win)], and expected value [EV = p(win) * amount - (1-
p(win)) * amount/2]. Amounts in the medium stake = 2 x low stake; amount in the high stake = 4 x 
low stake. Amounts decreased exponentially to make the higher amounts more attractive. The 
highest and lowest amounts for each stake never occurred in the other stake conditions.   
 Table E1 shows that the expected value of the 6 free-choice options differed. The two most 
risky options (choice options 5-6) had a negative expected value. We included these options 
because superficially attractive options, associated with relatively high amounts but with a negative 
EV, are common in gambling situations (for instance in the lottery, on racing odds, or slot 
machines). On the other side of the choice spectrum, we included a choice option with a high 
probability of winning but with a relatively low EV (choice option 1). We included this option to test 
whether stopping-induced cautiousness could encourage risk-aversive behaviour even when 
consistently choosing the safest amount leads to smaller gains. Finally, the EV of the other options 
was higher but probabilities of winning were different.  
 If our stop manipulations specifically altered ‘optimal decision making’, we would expect to 
observe differences in the likelihood of selecting choice option = 3 (i.e. the option with the highest 
EV). To anticipate the results, Figures 2B & 5 (main text; see also footnote 2 main text) show that 
across experiments, participants specifically avoided the high-risk bets with a negative expected 
value (options 5-6) and preferred bets with a low positive expected value but high probability of 
winning (option 1) in stop blocks or after stop training. 
 
Analyses of average standard deviation (SD) of the betting scores and choice latencies in 
the gambling task for Experiment 1–3 
In addition to the analyses of the betting scores, we analysed the average standard deviation (SD) 
of the betting scores by means of mixed ANOVAs to assess whether concurrent motor tasks 
(Experiment 1) or training (Experiments 2–3) resulted in more random or variable choice 
behaviour. We also examined latencies of the choice response on no-signal trials (choice latency = 
‘time choice response’ – ‘time top line is reached’. Negative latencies indicate that subjects 
responded before the top line was reached). Summaries of the analyses appear in Table E2 
(Experiment 1) and Table E3 (Experiments 2-3).  
  In Experiment 1, mean SD of betting scores was generally comparable for dual-task (mean 
SD: 1.05) and single-task blocks (mean SD: 1.05). Thus, multitasking did not result in more 
random or variable responding. There was a main effect of stake (Table E2); mean SD decreased 
when stake increased (low: 1.11, medium: 1.06, high: 0.98). There was no reliable difference 
between the groups. The analyses of latencies of the choice response revealed a two-way 
interaction between Block Type and Group. For the stop group, choice latencies were longer in the 
2 
 
dual-task blocks (+60 ms) than in the single-task blocks (-2.9 ms; F1,23 = 69.1, P = .001). A similar, 
albeit smaller difference was found for the double-response group: choice latencies were longer in 
the dual-task blocks (+38 ms) than in the single-task blocks (+0.5 ms; F1,23 = 28.4, P = .001).  
 In Experiment 2, there were no effects on standard deviation or latency of the choice 
response in the test phase (Table E3; the mean choice latencies were -7, -7, and +7 ms for stop, 
double-response, and control groups, respectively). In Experiment 3, there was a significant main 
effect of Block and an interaction between Group and Block for SD (Table E3). Inspection of the 
data showed that SD decreased over blocks. Furthermore, there was a numerical trend for a 
higher SD after stop training than after double-response training at the beginning of the 
experiment. However, none of the individual post-hoc contrasts (stop vs. double-response) 
reached significance (all uncorrected p’s > .13). There was no reliable difference in choice 
latencies (stop = -10 ms, double-response = 7 ms;Table E3).  
 
Supplementary analyses Experiment 1: Effects of baseline risk-taking, choice latency & bar 
height, learning, block order, and differential weighting of wins & losses.  
Experiment 1 indicates that motor control modulated monetary gambling. When subjects prepared 
to stop a motor response, they placed safer bets. Figure E1 shows that this ‘dual-task effect’ did 
not correlate with the baseline betting scores in the single-task blocks.  
 Additional analyses confirmed that the difference between dual-task and single-task blocks 
in the stop group was not caused by latency differences. Choice-indication latencies were 63 ms 
longer in the dual-task blocks (in which stop signals could occur) than in the single-task blocks. 
Even though this difference is very small relative to the duration of a trial (average = 5 sec.), we 
wanted to exclude the possibility that the choice differences between dual-task and single-task 
blocks were merely due to latency differences. To test this, we analysed betting scores in the stop 
group as a function of bar height (see Figure 1 of main manuscript). Subjects had less time to 
decide on ‘low-bar’ trials than on ‘high-bar’ trials (time difference = 333 ms). If the effect of motor 
cautiousness on gambling is mediated by decision time then the effect of block type should be 
larger for ‘low-bar’ trials than for ‘high-bar’ trials. However, bar height did not interact with the effect 
of Block Type (dual-task vs. single-task) [F(1,23) = 0.5, p = 0.47] for the stop group. For ‘low-bar’ 
trials, betting scores were 2.75 and 2.62 for single-task and dual-task blocks, respectively. For 
‘high-bar’ trials, betting scores were 2.78 and 2.61 for single-task and dual-task blocks, 
respectively. There was no main effect of bar height [F(1,23) = 0.01, p = .93]. 
 Third, we tested whether the dual-task effect increased or decreased during the 
experimental session. Even though subjects were told that wins were less probable for higher 
amounts, the exact probabilities were not revealed. Thus, there was a small probability-learning 
element to our task, which could have been influenced by occasional stopping. Participants were 
also not told what the expected value was of each choice option. Occasional stopping could have 
interfered with estimating these values. Therefore, we re-analyzed betting scores by means of a 2 
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(Group: double-response vs. stop) x 2 (Block Type: single-task vs. dual-task) x 2 (Part: first half vs. 
second half of the experimental session) mixed ANOVA. There was a main effect of Part [F(1,46) = 
10.6, p = .002], and a reliable interaction between Part and Group [F(1,46) = 6.7, p = .01]. Subjects 
in the double-response group tended to place safer bets in the second part of the session (mean 
betting score = 2.48) than in the first half of the session (mean betting score: 3.03). A similar, albeit 
smaller, effect of part was found in the stop group (mean betting score second half = 2.66, betting 
score first half: 2.72). The three-way interaction between Part, Group and Block Type was not 
reliable [F(1,46) = 0.8, p = .38], which suggests that the dual-task effect did not change during the 
experimental session. This is inconsistent with a learning account.  
 Fourth, we controlled for effects of block order. On average, single-task blocks occurred 
earlier than dual-task blocks. The double-response condition suggests that the effect of stopping 
was not due to an order confound. Furthermore, there was no interaction between part and the 
dual-task effect (see above). Thus, we think that it is unlikely that the effects were due to block 
order. Nevertheless, we re-analysed the data by means of a 2 (Group: double-response vs. stop) x 
2 (Block Type: single-task vs. dual-task) x 2 (Part: first half vs. second half of the experimental 
session) mixed ANOVA after omitting blocks 1 and 8. Thus, on average dual-task blocks occurred 
earlier than single-task blocks in this new analysis. There was still an interaction between group 
and block type [F(1,46) = 3.94, p = .05]. Mean betting scores double-response group = 2.69 
(single-task) and 2.77 (dual-task); mean betting scores stop group = 2.74 (single-task) and 2.59 
(dual-task). The three-way interaction between Part, Group and Block Type was not reliable (F < 
1).  
 Finally, it is also very unlikely that our stop-manipulation generally primed subjects to focus 
more on either wins or losses, or that the manipulation influenced probability learning or estimating 
the expected value of the choice options. If preparation for stopping influenced the respective 
weighting of wins and losses, then the ‘dual-task’ effect should have been largest for the ‘high’ 
stake trials on which subjects could win or lose the greatest amounts. Previous work has shown 
that a differential focus on wins vs. losses has stronger effects when stakes are high (e.g. 
Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002). However, we found that the dual-task effect did 
not increase with stake (p = .69; see Table 2, main text). 
 
Supplementary analyses Experiments 2-3: Correlations between training- and test 
performance 
Response latencies of no-signal trials in the training phase are shown in Figure E2. In the training 
phase, subjects were not rewarded for successful stopping or penalised for unsuccessful stopping. 
Furthermore, they were told that it was normal that they could only stop on approximately half of 
the trials. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the effects observed in the present study were 
mediated by the outcome of the stop process. This was supported by the absence of significant 
correlations between stop measures and betting scores (see Figure E3); note that because a 
4 
 
tracking procedure was used, p(respond) was close to .50 for all subjects. Combined, these 
analyses show that the effect of occasional stopping did not correlate with the outcome of the stop 
process, which is consistent with the findings of Experiment 1.  
 Note that the findings of Experiments 2-3 also go beyond recently reported effects of 
incidental cues on framing and decision-making. In particular, it was shown that incidental cues 
that had acquired an association with winning or losing in a training phase could bias decision-
making under risk when these cues were presented again during a gambling task (Guitart-Masip, 
Talmi, & Dolan, 2010). This is consistent with the idea that learning and practice can have an 
important impact on decision-making. However, in Experiments 2-3 of the present study, 
participants did not win or lose points in the training phase. Furthermore, different task stimuli and 
cues were used in the training and test phases. Consequently, the after-effects of stopping in 
Experiments 2-3 cannot be explained by learned associations between incidental cues and 
winning or losing. Instead, the training effects we observed appear more general: engaging 
inhibitory motor control in the stop task primed subjects to become risk-averse in an unrelated 
gambling task.  
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Table E1: Points, probability of winning, and expected values of the free-choice options.  
Stake 
Average 
points p(win) EV High Medium Low 
8 4 2 5 0.75 3 
24 12 6 14 0.63 6 
64 32 16 37 0.51 10 
128 64 32 75 0.39 6 
256 128 64 149 0.27 -14 
448 224 112 261 0.15 -72 
 
 
 
Note: We present rounded values in this table because participants could win only ‘full’ points in 
the experiment.
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Table E2: Overview of analyses of variance for Experiment 1.  
We analysed average standard deviations (SD) of betting scores and latencies of the choice 
response by means of a mixed ANOVA with Block Type (single-task vs. dual-task) and Stake (low, 
medium, high) as within-subjects factors and Group (double-response vs. stop) as between-
subjects factor. P’s < .05 are bold.  
 SD (betting score) Latency choice response 
 df F p df F p 
Group (G) 1,46 2.30 0.14 1,46 0.75 0.39 
Block Type (BT) 1,46 0.01 0.93 1,46 94.3 0.001 
Stake (S) 2,92 8.39 0.001 2,92 0.84 0.44 
G X BT 1,46 1.25 0.27 1,46 5.87 0.02 
G x S 2,92 1.22 0.30 2,92 1.12 0.33 
BT x S 2,92 2.51 0.09 2,92 2.00 0.14 
G x BT x S 2,92 0.80 0.45 2,92 1.38 0.26 
 
 
Table E3: Overview of analyses of variance for the test phase of Experiments 2-3.  
For each experiment, we analysed separately betting scores, standard deviations of betting scores 
and latencies of the choice response by means of a mixed ANOVA with Block (Exp.2: test block 1-
7; Exp.3: test block 1-14) and Stake (low, medium, high) as within-subjects factors and Group 
(double-response, stop or control) as between-subjects factor. Because there were not enough 
observations for a full factorial analysis, we performed separate tests for Block and Stake. P’s < 
.05 are bold. 
 SD (betting score) Latency choice response 
df F p df F p 
Experiment 2       
 Group (G) 2,78 0.16 0.85 2,78 0.29 0.75 
 Block (B) 6,468 1.56 0.16 6,468 0.12 0.99 
 Stake (S) 2,156 2.22 0.11 2,156 1.24 0.29 
 G X B 12,468 1.31 0.21 12,468 0.52 0.90 
 G x S 4,156 0.60 0.66 4,156 0.45 0.77 
Experiment 3       
 Group (G) 1,52 0.02 0.89 1,52 0.67 0.41 
 Block (B) 13,676 1.85 0.03 13,676 1.28 0.22 
 Stake (S) 2,104 0.03 0.97 2,104 0.02 0.98 
 G X B 13,676 1.77 0.03 13,676 0.92 0.53 
 G x S 2,104 0.34 0.71 2,104 0.58 0.57 
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Table E4. The proportion of each choice response for the groups and block types in Experiment 1 
and the groups of Experiments 2-3. The expected proportion for each cell = 0.166. Even though 
there appears to be a small overall bias towards responses ‘h’ and ‘j’, close inspection of the 
individual data suggests that all the participants took the amounts associated with each response 
into account (i.e. they did not select the same key throughout the whole experiment). This is also 
supported by the analyses of the choice proportions (main text): if participants selected responses 
instead of amounts, the proportions should be similar for all choice options. As can be seen in 
Figures 2 & 5 in the main text, this was not the case. 
 
   ‘d’ ‘f’ ‘g’ ‘h’ ‘j’ ‘k’ 
Experiment 1       
 double-response   
  single-task 0.118 0.154 0.168 0.197 0.201 0.162 
  dual-task 0.115 0.153 0.181 0.226 0.187 0.138 
 stop       
  single-task 0.132 0.177 0.173 0.192 0.180 0.146 
  dual-task 0.140 0.176 0.169 0.183 0.186 0.146 
Experiment 2   
 stop 0.138 0.175 0.164 0.166 0.192 0.165 
 double-response 0.143 0.170 0.166 0.179 0.185 0.158 
 control 0.155 0.160 0.168 0.166 0.188 0.163 
Experiment 3       
 stop 0.160 0.177 0.152 0.168 0.184 0.159 
 double-response 0.147 0.162 0.169 0.177 0.195 0.149 
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Figure E1: Correlation between the ‘dual-task effect’ and ‘betting score’ in single-task 
blocks 
The correlation between the ‘dual-task effect’ and the betting score in the single-task blocks (which 
is an estimate of baseline risk taking in our gambling task) for Experiment 1. No significant 
correlation was observed (r = 0.07, P = .74), which suggests that the dual-task effect was not 
influenced by baseline risk taking. 
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Figure E2: Response latencies Experiments 2-3 
Response latencies of no-signal trials in the training phase of Experiment 2 and 3 as a function of 
block number and group. In Experiment 2 (A), there was a main effect of Group (P < .001). There 
was also an interaction between Group and Block (P < .011). RTs decreased over practice in the 
double-response group but not in the stop group. Possibly, proactive control adjustments 
counteracted the effect of practice on response latencies in the stop group. In Experiment 3 (B), 
there were main effects of Group (P < .001) and Block (P < .001). Again, there was an interaction 
between Group and Block (P < .017): RTs decreased more over practice in the double-response 
group than in the stop group. Again, this could be due to proactive control adjustments in the stop 
group.  
 
 
10 
 
Figure E3: Correlations between stop measures and betting scores  
in Experiments 2-3  
The latency of the stop process was estimated using the integration method. Mean latency of the 
stop process was 0.206 sec. in Experiment 2 and 0.217 sec. in Experiment 3. The correlation 
between the latency of the stop process and betting scores was non-significant in both Experiment 
2 (r = .02 P = .90) and Experiment 3 (r = -.15 P = .46) (A).  Similarly, the correlation between the 
probability of responding on signal trials and betting scores was non-significant in Experiments 3 (r 
= .04, P = .84) and 4 (r = .02, P = .95). Mean probability of responding on stop-signal trials was .49 
and .50, for Experiment 2 and 3, respectively (B). 
 
 
